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1. Problem. 
We usually think of status inconsistency theories as either additive or 
non-additive: Additive theories explain inconsistency effects as a linear combina-
tion of the independent effects of inconsistent status characteristics, non-additive 
theories explain them as a linear combination of independent effects of inconsistent 
status characteristics and (or only) an effect of some sort of strain towards con-
sistency. One example of a non-additive theory is Lenski's theory of status crys-
tallization:1 In Lenski's theory a status inconsistent defines a social situation 
in terms of one or the other of two inconsistent status characteristics but not 
both. The definition always maximizes status. Others behave in the same way; that 
is, they define the situation in terms of their highest status. The consequence is 
always conflict, produced by the differences in the way the situation is defined. 
The consequence of conflict is strain, i.e. some sort of individual tension. This 
strain produces symptoms of stress and pressures either to withdraw from the situa-
tion or change it in the direction of consistency. This model fits the available 
2 data reasonably well, but a decade ago Duncan pointed out that additive models of 
3 
the same kind of data fit them equally well and are simpler. No data since that 
time have been uncovered that offer any compelling reason for rejecting the additive 4 
model in favor of the more complicated non-additive model. But the conclusion of 
this whole line of reasoning has depended on tacitly assuming that the only alter-
natives are Lenski or the additive model. There are in fact a fair number of alter-
native non-additive models.^ At least some of these, for example Hughes' theory of 
status dilemmas (1945), are so different from Lenski's that the evidence bearing on 
the choice between Lenski and the additive model do not rule them out at all. 
The Hughes theory of status dilemmas differs from the Lenski theory of status 
crystallization in at least three important respects. First, Lenski's theory con-
ceptualizes inconsistency as a property of individuals, Hughes' theory conceptualizes 
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it as a property of social relations. In the theory of status crystallization, for 
example, a female professor is inconsistent whether her student is male or female, a 
black doctor is inconsistent whether his patient is black or white. In the theory 
of status dilemmas, female students and black patients create no dilemmas. 
Second, in the theory of status crystallization inconsistency is a situation-
free concept. In the theory of status dilemmas, social relations are carefully sit-
uated. It makes a difference, in Hughes' theory, not only who the other is but what 
the situation requires. Hughes' stock example, the white patient with a black doc-
tor, is faced with a dilemma of choice because he requires treatment. That is, 
there are specific conditions that activate the characteristics that are inconsis-
tent. It is doubtful, for example, that from an interactionist point of view a 
female professor poses a problem for the University registrar. Her dilemma, if 
there is one, occurs in specific kinds of situations, such as classrooms or depart-
ment meetings. 
One important consequence of these first two differences between Hughes and 
Lenski is that individuals who are never inconsistent in Lenski's theory are some-
times inconsistent in Hughes'. For example, the male student or white patient is 
never inconsistent in Lenski's theory. More generally, in Hughes' theory anyone can 
be inconsistent in some circumstances just as anyone (even female professors or 
black doctors) can be consistent in some circumstances. It is not necessary to 
insist that Hughes is right and Lenski wrong, only that the difference has an impor-
tant bearing on the interpretation of evidence about inconsistency effects. Evi-
dence against an inconsistency effect in a population of female professors or black 
doctors is from the point of view of Lenski's conceptualization of inconsistency a 
sound reason for rejecting his theory. From the point of view of Hughes' conceptu-
alization of inconsistency, it shows only that it is meaningless to ask questions 
about female professors or black doctors regardless of who the other is or what the 
situation requires. 
Digressing for a moment, it should be pointed out that the conventional 
additive model of multi-characteristic status situations conceptualizes status char-
acteristics in the same way that Lenski does—possibly because its argument has been 
almost wholly with Lenski. But there is no reason to suppose that there is just one 
kind of additive model, any more than there is to suppose that there is just one 
kind of non-additive model. For example, an additive interactionist model is per-
fectly possible, though it would look very different from the bulk of the research 
of the last decade and require different methods of observation and inference. 
A third important difference between Hughes and Lenski is the kind of consis-
tency assumption the two theories make. Both are "balance" theories, in the sense 
that in both a female professor or black doctor must define their situations in 
terms of one or the other, but not both, of their inconsistent status characteris-
tics.^ The female professor is either female or professor, the black doctor is 
either black or doctor. The dilemma, in both theories, stems from the fact that 
inconsistent status characteristics imply incompatible expectations for the same 
situation—that the female defer to the male but the student defer to the professor, 
that the patient defer to the doctor but the black to the white. But the two theo-
ries differ in how the dilemma is resolved. In Lenski's theory, the resolution of 
status inconsistency always maximizes status: All female professors define them-
selves as professors, their male students all define them as female; all black doc-
tors define themselves as doctors, their white patients all define them as black. 
Much weaker consistency assumptions are possible. Hughes' theory, for example, 
assumes nothing about maximizing status. It is in fact largely concerned with how 
dilemmas are avoided, and assumes nothing at all about how inconsistencies are 
resolved. To Hughes, dilemmas make interaction problematic, because it becomes 
doubtful that the meaning one gives to the behavior of others is the meaning they 
intended, that the other will take what one does in the way it was intended, and 
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ambiguous whether one should give or expect deference. But he assumes only that the 
dilemma must be resolved, he has nothing to say about how. A female professor must 
be either a female or a professor, but some can be female and some professor. 
Again, the difference between the two theories has an important bearing on 
the methods by which inconsistency data are analyzed. Lenski's method was to aggre-
gate Individual reactions to inconsistency. In this, Duncan's method followed 
Lenski's and the choice between an additive and non-additive model has been based on 
such aggregate analysis. This seems reasonable enough: A white patient, for exam-
ple, has only three ways of defining a black doctor. He is either a black, or a 
doctor, or some combination of the two. If for the moment we accept the white 
patient's deference behavior as observable grounds for inferring which definition he 
uses, then he either defers to the same extent that he does to any other doctor, he 
defers as little as he defers to other blacks, or he defers to the black doctor more 
than to other blacks but less than to other doctors. If we aggregate evidence over 
a population of white patients, any evidence that they defer to black doctors more 
than to other blacks but less than to other doctors is therefore evidence against 
any strain towards consistency. But this conclusion depends on assuming that all 
individuals resolve inconsistency in the same way. If some white patients define 
black doctors as blacks and others define them as doctors, then the aggregate of 
their deference behavior is again some intermediate value between their deference to 
doctors and their deference to blacks. The same aggregate value, in other words, is 
consistent with either an additive or a non-additive model of multi-characteristic 
status situations. Only the distribution of individual deference behavior will dis-
tinguish the two. If white patients define black doctors by combining the effects of 
both race and occupation, the distribution of their individual deference behavior 
should be unimodal around the mean value. If white patients define black doctors by 
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some balance mechanism, that is, by defining their situation in terms of one or the 
other, but not both status characteristics, but some balance in the direction of 
their higher status and some in the direction of their lower status, then the dis-
tribution of their deference behavior should be bimodal. 
Again we do not insist that Hughes is right and Lenski wrong, only that the 
methods typically used to analyze inconsistency data will not resolve the question. 
The objection to aggregate analysis, of course, depends on the importance we have 
tacitly given to the resolution of inconsistency. Most research on status inconsis-
tency, and therefore most research that concerns the additive model of multi-charac-
teristic status situations, is concerned with reactions to conflict, not with the 
resolution of inconsistency. To the extent that some individuals balance in one 
direction and others with whom they interact balance in the opposite direction there 
should be some conflict, even in an interactionist theory. To the extent that there 
is conflict, there should be signs of tension, withdrawal, pressures to change the 
situation. It makes no difference how the conflict arose, the aggregate method will 
detect it. That is, with this kind of dependent variable the value of any measure 
of an inconsistency effect will be greater for inconsistents than for consistents. 
It cannot take some intermediate value between consistents of high and consistents 
of low status, even if they do not maximize status. Nevertheless, the method is 
insensitive to the processes at work in an interactionist balance theory, even if it 
is perfectly well-adapted to those implied in Lenski. Of course, Hughes himself was 
hardly concerned with the resolution of inconsistency and it may seem unfair to 
object in his name to the aggregate method because it neglects certain possible 
resolutions of inconsistency. In Hughes, the concept of a status dilemma underlies 
the emergence of various structural arrangements designed to prevent dilemmas from 
occurring. Resolution behavior is the least of his concerns. But his assumptions 
make it possible to conceive of situations in which a balance mechanism is at work 
that will not be detected by an aggregate method of analyzing inconsistency data. 
For example, it will not detect a female professor who defines herself as a profes-
sor in a classroom of male students all of whom define themselves as students, even 
though only a balance mechanism could produce such an effect. 
From an interactionist perspective, then, Lenski's theory of status crystal-
lization is in trouble for some very good reasons but his is only one of a number of 
possible non-additive theories and the same reasons do not convincingly dispose of 
all of them. A choice between additive and non-additive models of multi-character-
istic status situations requires some refinements in our methods of observation and 
inference. In particular, to discount the theory of status dilemmas, the evidence 
must provide us with (1) information about the relationship in which inconsistency 
occurs; (2) information about the setting in which this relationship is situated; 
(3) information about individual resolutions of inconsistency. 
There is at least one investigation that satisfies all three criteria and it 
finds no support at all for a balance or consistency principle. Berger and Fisek 
(1970) artificially created two specific, task-relevant status characteristics and 
studied their effect on the distribution of influence in binary-choice, decision-
making experiments. Individuals in this experiment deferred markedly to the other 
if their own status was consistently low and the other was consistently high. They 
deferred very little if their own status was consistently high and the other was 
consistently low. But if their status characteristics were inconsistent, they 
deferred to the other more than the consistently high-low but less than the consis-
tently low-high subjects and the distribution of their individual deference behavior 
was unimodal around the mean value.^ 
Thus, the foundation on which the theory of status dilemmas rests, the idea 
that inconsistent individuals must chose between mutually exclusive alternatives in 
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defining self and other, does not seem to be supported even where the data are 
adequate to test it. But the Berger—Fisek experiment does not altogether rule out a 
strain towards consistency because it tests it for a rather special case. Berger 
and Fisek reasoned that the strongest possible test of the consistency principle is 
in situations in which the only status characteristics are all directly relevant to 
the goals of the individuals in the situation. It is the strongest possible test in 
the sense that if the consistency principle did work in this situation it would be 
reasonable to suppose that it worked in any situation in which it was even easier to 
discount the relevance of some of the status information given the individual. But 
it does not follow that if the consistency principle fails this test it must fail 
also in situations where the relevance of some or all of the status characteristics 
is more readily discounted. It is possible that the structure of this particular 
situation, because it makes both status characteristics directly relevant, in a 
sense works against balance or consistency processes that would show themselves 
where one or both of the inconsistent status characteristics were less directly 
relevant to the interaction required by the task situation. And so the basic ques-
tion is still unresolved. 
All that we require to resolve it, however, is to relax the conditions that 
make all inconsistent status characteristics directly relevant to the task situa-
tion. That is what we propose to do in the present investigation. 
But there are two rather distinct cases to consider. A partially relevant 
multi-characteristic status situation defines at least one status characteristic as 
relevant to whatever the situation requires; the other characteristics are neither 
relevant nor irrelevant. The female professor in the classroom, the black doctor 
treating a white patient both involve a relevant and a non-relevant status charac-
teristic. The professor's knowledge of her subject is defined by the situation 
itself as relevant. Her sex is not defined as relevant, but nothing specifically 
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defines it as irrelevant. The doctor's ability to distinguish measles from chicken 
pox, to palpate a chest and set a bone, are defined as relevant characteristics by 
the fact that the other is a patient. That the doctor is black and the patient 
white is not specifically relevant, even though nothing defines it as irrelevant. 
The structure of a non-relevant multi-characteristic status situation does not 
define any of its status characteristics as directly relevant. The female professor 
in politics or the black doctor on a jury may, because of their status characteris-
tics, have rather special roles to play, but it is not the structure of the situa-
tions themselves that defines their status characteristics as relevant. 
The partially relevant status situation has some advantages over the non-
relevant status situation as a starting point for further investigation of the con-
sistency hypothesis. For one thing, it is more nearly what Hughes had in mind in 
his theory of status dilemmas. In Hughes' theory, there are two kinds of status 
characteristics: specifically determining characteristics, which are the technical 
skills and qualifications of a role—the doctor's MD, knowing the measles, knowing 
how to set a bone—and auxiliary characteristics, which are any other socially mean-
ingful attributes of the person, such as age, sex, race, religion or social origin. 
It is the contradiction between a specifically determining and an auxiliary charac-
teristic that creates a status dilemma. The problem of the black doctor is that the 
other is not only white, he is a patient. There is not only a contradiction, there 
is something to be done, and what is to be done partially defines what among the 
individual's status characteristics is relevant. But not only is the partially 
relevant situation Hughes' situation, and therefore a suitable test of his theory 
that it creates a dilemma and is resolved by some balance mechanism, it also has 
certain strategic advantages over the non-relevant situation. The partially rele-
vant situation should facilitate balance. If balance occurs anywhere, it ought to 
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occur there. The female professor in the classroom has every reason to define 
herself as professor; the male student has every reason to define himself as stu-
dent. The situation requires no further definition, there is no real reason for its 
< further modification by sex. If, therefore, we do not find balancing in a partially 
relevant status situation there is probably little point in pursuing balance fur-
ther. If we do find balance there, we must of course complete the investigation by 
studying the non-relevant situation too. But if we take the non-relevant status 
situation as our starting point, we must go on to investigate the partially relevant 
situation no matter what the outcome. 
We therefore pursue the further investigation of the consistency hypothesis 
with a study of the resolution of inconsistency in partially relevant status situa-
tions. We report here two experiments in situations in which there is a task to 
perform; a subject works as one of a team with another individual; each individual 
is characterized by just two status characteristics, one of which is directly rele-
vant to the task, the other of which is a diffuse status characteristic that is v 
neither relevant nor irrelevant; and the specific characteristic is inconsistent 
with the diffuse characteristic. We want to know whether the subjects combine the 
effects of the two characteristics or form a univalent (balanced) status hierarchy. 
2. Analysis and conceptualization of the interaction situation. 
To facilitate its analysis, we shall reconceptualize the problem in terms of 
g 
a simplified theoretical structure. Although simpler than usually used for analy-
sis of multi-characteristic status situations, and certainly simpler than Hughes' 
theory of status dilemmas, we believe this structure contains those elements that 
are most important to understanding the process. 
We suppose a group containing two or more individuals. The group is viewed 
from the perspective of one of these individuals, say p. To simplify discussion-of 
the group, and with little loss of generality insofar as consistency .is concerned^ 
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we may think of the group as having just one other individual, o. The fact that we 
see the situation from the point of view of p may seem to imply that we are con-
cerned with the psychology of the individual actor, but in fact we have no such 
interest. On the contrary, we obviously assume an interactionist social psychology. 
The characteristics in terms of which actors in the theory are described are rela-
tional, their effects depend almost entirely on the structure of the situation in 
which the individual is placed. Nothing at all is assumed about stable components 
of personality. If there are such components, nothing in the theory depends on 
them. What p-centricity means, to this theory, is that the characteristics describ-
ing p and o are social in origin. There is no intrinsic meaning to sex, race, age, 
education, ethnicity, not even to specific skills such as mathematical ability or 
perfect pitch. Their significance, their social meaning, is given not in nature but 
in society. Their significance may therefore vary from group to group and society 
to society. It is this variability that we express in the theory by taking the 
point of view of the actors who construct tiie definition of their situation. To 
accomplish this purpose with any precision it is necessary to look at the situation 
from the point of view of one focal actor, hence the arbitrary chpice of p's point 
of view. The behavior of the group as a whole is derived from p's definition of it 
by composition. That is, the other, o, is from p's point of view only an object of 
orientation. But a simple shift in point of view substitutes o for p. The behavior 
of the composition, of course, need not be and often is not the same as the behavior 
of any individual member,. and we do not assume that the analysis of the situation 
as a whole is derivable simply by adding up individual viewpoints. Our theory 
assumes that an individual who believes himself superior and his partner inferior at 
a task they perform together will expect more opportunities to perform than his 
partner, take more of them, evaluate his partner's contributions as inferior, and 
accept few of the other's attempts to influence him. Two such individuals, i.e., two 
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each of whom assumes he is superior and his partner inferior, are obviously in 
conflict, a fact not discoverable by studying the situation from the perspective of 
just one of the individuals in it. A composition begins ^ nevertheless, with the 
behavior of the individual actor in a given, specifiable situation, and the focus of 
the present investigation is on the situation as seen by the focal actor, p. 
We consider only the case in which p and o are jointly engaged in the solu-
tion of some valued task. A task is any activity that involves the contributions of 
individuals to the accomplishment of some end that has at least two possible out-
comes. The concept, despite the rather special connotations of the word "task" in 
our society, is therefore a very general one. A task is valued if the possible out-
comes are defined as "success" and "failure." Again, these are p-centric concepts: 
A team of surgeons shares a task. It cannot be assumed that the death of the 
patient is "failure," however, for there may be no possibility of curing the patient. 
Not predicting that death is inevitable might well be how a surgeon thinks of fail-
ure. What constitutes success or failure, therefore, is not of moment to the the-
ory, providing that something is success and something failure and the behavior of 
the individuals in the group at least in part determines the outcome. A valued task 
is collective if the outcome is the joint product of the behavior of the members of 
the group. The verdict of a jury is a collective outcome, the deliberations of the 
jury a collective task. There is only one decision representing the jury as a whole. 
The members of a group performing a task are task-oriented if it matters to them 
whether they are successful or not, and collectively-oriented if they understand 
that any individual may adopt the view of any other if by doing so they can assure a 
correct collective decision. The legitimacy of making use of the contributions of 
others is an important condition of the investigations we report here. Situations 
in which individuals are person-oriented, in which they would rather be wrong than 
"cheat," in which accepting advice is thought to be immoral even if it is likely to 
be good advice, are outside the scope of our theory. 
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The theory focuses on four kinds of observable interaction: P and o offer 
each other action opportunities—a turn of the head that invites a contribution, a 
question that requires an answer, a nod that suggests continuing to talk. Taking 
such an opportunity is a performance output—anything that suggests a solution of 
the task. Reactions to performance outputs are reward actions—praise, agreement, 
disagreement, antagonism. Finally, a change in the solution accepted by p or o if 
there is a disagreement is influence. In the present investigation, our attention 
is focused on the distribution of influence, and what figures as deference in the 
theory of status dilemmas is here equated with the acceptance or rejection of the 
influence of others. 
These observable behaviors are treated as functions of two unobservable con-
structs, unit evaluations, which are evaluations of performance outputs, and 
expectation-states, which are underlying conceptions of the future capacity of 
individuals in the group to contribute to success at the task. That p believes he 
is superior to o at the task is an expectation-state; that p therefore judges o's 
last suggestion as stupid is a unit-evaluation. If p actually expresses this evalu-
ation, disagreeing with o, it is reflected in an overt reward action, but of course 
a unit evaluation may not be openly expressed. Both unit evaluations and expecta-
tion-states are relational concepts. That is, they are evaluations or conceptions 
of self in relation to another. An individual may be a master chess player, but to 
characterize fully his expectation-state for any particular situation, we require 
the further information that the other is also either a master or a tyro. A situa-
tion in which p has a great deal of the ability but o is p's equal is distinct from 
a situation in which p is a master but o is an inferior player. An expectation-
state that does not specify who the other is and hot* the self is evaluated relative 
to that other is a grammatically meaningless expression in the theory. It is of 
course possible that p does not know how he stands compared to o, and this is a 
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meaningful expression in the theory. But it is assumed that behavior relative to an 
undefined other is measurably different from behavior relative to a defined other. 
In this sense, the definition of the other is still a necessary aspect of any situa-
tion accounted for in the theory. 
In many social situations, the expectation-states that individuals form for 
themselves and others are determined not so much by their interaction in the situa-
tion itself as by prior beliefs that they bring to the situation. P may believe, 
because of prior experience in school, that he is a poor athlete. Or p may believe, 
because o is black, that o is a good athlete. In general, we assume that p and o 
can be described by a number of characteristics. They may be any sort of attribute 
whatever—the ability to solve mathematical puzzles, to speak articulately, to play 
master-class chess, or age, sex, race, education or occupation. A characteristic is 
a status characteristic if the states of the characteristic (high or low ability, 
white or black race, 1, 2, ..., 12, 13, ... years of education) are differentially 
evaluated and give rise to some cognitive conception of the individuals who possess 
them. It is of course possible that the "higher" state of a characteristic is its 
negatively evaluated state. There are worlds in which the better the cotton picker, 
the lower the status. Hence, the state and the value of a state of a status charac-
teristic are distinct concepts in the theory. 
Status characteristics can be of two kinds: Specific status characteristics 
are associated with specific performance expectations. They are beliefs about how 
an individual possessing a given state of the characteristic will perform in well-
defined and specified tasks. Solving mathematical puzzles, playing tennis, picking 
cotton are specific status characteristics. In each case, the individual is per-
forming some specific action. Diffuse status characteristics are by comparison 
vague and global in their referents. They are associated with general rather than 
specific expectation-states: intelligence, athletic prowess, immorality rather than 
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arithmetic skills, a good serve at tennis, or meaning-insight ability. Host of them, 
as a matter of fact, are purely symbolic in significance. They mean nothing in 
themselves; their meaning is exhausted in the cognitive and evaluative associations 
attached to them. Race, sex, ethnicity mean the evaluations and expectation-states 
associated with being black, female, Chicano; they have, of course, a technical mean-
ing, but it plays no part in social relations. Even in the case of characteristics 
like education and occupation, however, it is only with their symbolic aspects that 
the theory is concerned. The nonsymbolic aspects of these characteristics (for 
example, the actual broadening of experience that presumably goes with a college 
education) are treated as unimportant in the theory. What the theory abstracts from 
diffuse status characteristics is the cognitive and evaluative associations of 
which they are the symbolic representation. 
Multi-characteristic status situations are situations in which p and o are 
described by two or more status characteristics, whether diffuse or specific. The 
situations that interest us are either consistent or inconsistent. A multi-charac-
teristic status situation is consistent if all the individuals in it are consistent. 
Individuals are consistent if and only if the states of the status characteristics 
they possess all have the same evaluation. If characteristics C and D are two char-
acteristics, socially defined in such a way that the state x of C and state x of D 
are positively valued, while x of C and x of D are negatively valued, then individu-
als with states xx and xx are consistent, individuals with xx and xx are inconsis-
tent. Male doctor, male lax-7yer, male professor, white doctor, white lawyer, white 
professor are consistent, assuming that these characteristics are socially defined 
in the manner conventional in the contemporary United States. Female doctor, 
female lawyer, female professor, black doctor, black lawyer, black professor are 
inconsistent. It must always be kept in mind, of course, that the evaluations of 
such characteristics are p-centric. They depend on the particular cultural 
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conceptions of the particular society in which the evaluations function, and 
consistency and inconsistency, like status characteristics, have no meaning apart 
from these cultural conceptions. 
In inconsistent multi-characteristic status situations, individuals have two 
different bases for forming expectation-states, and the two bases provide contradic-
tory ways of defining the situation. If o has one set of characteristics that are 
positively valued and another that are negatively valued, p is provided i/ith two 
kinds of social definition of o. One defines o as the kind of person one listens to, 
defers to, respects. The other defines o as the kind of person who has little to 
say, what o says is not worth listening to, and what is listened to commands little 
respect. There are two ways of forming expectation-states in this kind of situa-
tion: P may balance the inconsistent definitions, defining the situation in terms 
of one or the other of its two possible definitions. The male student may define 
the female professor as a professor, himself as a student; the white client may 
define the black lawyer as a lawyer, himself as a client. Or the male student may 
define the female professor as a female, himself as a male; the white client may 
define the black lawyer as a black, himself as a white. In other xrords, p forms 
expectations that correspond to a consistent or univalent definition, reducing incon-
sistency to a unique balanced structure. Or p may combine the inconsistent defini-
tions, forming an expectation-state that is some average of the two ways of defin-
ing the situation. The male student may listen more attentively to the female pro-
fessor than to other females, but less attentively than to other professors; the 
white client may respect the advice of the black lawyer more than the advice of 
other blacks, but less than the advice of other lawyers. Either mechanism 
"resolves" the inconsistency; that is, either one forms an expectation-state that 
determines how action opportunities, performance outputs, reward actions, and 
influence are distributed. The formulation with which we are concerned, in other 
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words, does not consider tension, conflict, or the reactions they produce; it 
focuses only on i-c=oiution of inconsistency. 
Ilore precisely, the problem witb which the present investigation is concerned 
involves two individuals, p and o, engaged in a valued collective task to which both 
are task-oriented. Each possesses some state of a specific status characteristic, 
C, that is instrumental to performance of the task, and some state of a diffuse 
status characteristic, D, that is neither relevant to the task nor known to be 
irrelevant. Both characteristics differentiate the two individuals; that is, if one 
has the state x of C, the other has the state x; if one has the state x of D, the 
other has the state x. We consider only the case in which the tiro characteristics 
are inconsistent, and are concerned with how p forms an expectation-state, given 
this inconsistency. We take the observable distribution of influence between p and 
o as evidence of the expectation-states they form. 
3. Method of investigation. 
We take advantage of the fact that the behavior of individuals in forming 
expectation-states is well-known: How they distribute influence in collective, 
9 
task-oriented situations has been thoroughly investigated for a number of years. 
Our method, therefore, is to define the situation in which ti?o individuals partici-
pate in terms of a specific, task-relevant characteristic, and then introduce an 
inconsistent diffuse status characteristic, observing the effects on the distribu-
tion of influence in the performance of an ambiguous, binary-choice, decision-making 
task. The task requires individuals to make decisions in two stages—each first 
makes an independent choice of what s/he believes to be the correct alternative, s/he 
is then allowed to communicate with her/his partner, after which they make a final 
choice that determines a joint outcome. It is the difference between initial and 
final choices that measures the influence of the other on the subject. In both the 
experiments we report here, the task-relevant characteristic is a fictitious ability 
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called contrast sensitivity. Contrast sensitivity is the ability to judge how much 
of an area of a slide, divided into small black and white squares, is white. The 
diffuse status characteristic in both experiments is education. 
The theory of status characteristics and expectation-states assumes all dif-
fuse status characteristics have certain important properties in common: that educa-
tion, for example, behaves like sex, race, occupation, or any other diffuse status 
characteristic, at least in the ways that matter to the theory. This assumption is 
justified by previous experiments in which education has had the same effect as race, 
sex, or military rank on the power-prestige order formed by task groups (Berger, 
Cohen and Zelditch, 1972; Cohen, Kiker and Kruse, 1969; Cohen, 1972; Freese and 
Cohen, 1973; Lockheed and Ilall, 1974; Moore, 1968; Zeller and Warnecke, 1973). This 
effect does not depend on the direct relevance of education to contrast sensitivity; 
in fact, in past experiments, it has been neither directly relevant nor irrelevant 
to the contrast sensitivity task. 
The basic experiment consists of two phases. In the first phase, the expec-
tation-states of the subjects are manipulated. In the second phase, they jointly 
perform the experimental task. The manipulation of expectation-states may assign to 
each subject a state of the specific status characteristic, a state of the diffuse 
status characteristic, or both. If subjects are to be given a state of the specific 
characteristic, contrast sensitivity, they are publicly tested for their ability, 
their scores are read out loud, and the meaning of the scores underlined so that 
they understand they are either very good at contrast sensitivity tasks while 
their partners are very poor, or they are very poor while their partners are very 
good. That their contrast sensitivity is directly relevant to the experimental 
task in phase two is clear from the close similarity of the slides used to test 
their ability to the slides used in the performance phase of the experiment. To 
manipulate the diffuse status characteristic, education, they are told what school 
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and what level in school each is supposedly at. In each experiment, all subjects 
have the same level of schooling. They are seated in cubicles divided by a parti-
tion, and do not see each other. To vary the status of the other, all subjects are 
told that one of the two individuals in the experiment has the level of schooling 
all of them in fact have, while the other individual in the experiment has either a 
higher or lower level of schooling. Each subject assumes that it is the other who 
is higher or lower. Thus, in our first experiment, all subjects are junior college 
females. They are told that one of them—without specifying which—is a junior col-
lege student, while the other is either a Stanford graduate student or a high school 
freshman. Each subject assumes that it is she that is the junior college student 
and the other that is the Stanford graduate student or the high school freshman. 
In the second phase of the experiment, subjects jointly perform a contrast 
sensitivity task. This task involves the visual judgment of a series of twenty-five 
slides, each consisting of two rectangular patterns, one above the other, of black 
and white squares. On each trial of the experiment, the subject judges which rec-
tangle of the slide contains more white area. Each rectangle in fact consists of 
the same number of black and white squares, although the arrangement of the squares 
is different. There are, therefore, no right or wrong answers. The probability of 
choosing the top rectangle as the correct answer if there is no experimental manipu-
lation of status or ability is approximately .5 for each slide. Nevertheless, sub-
jects are told that there is a correct answer. The order of presentation of the 
slides is randomized by selecting a random start for each replicate of the experi-
ment. The order is otherwise fixed. 
Although the subjects in the second phase of the experiment work as a team, 
they do not actually talk directly to each other. The communication of their choices 
is accomplished by an Interaction Control Machine that consists of two consoles, one 
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in front of each subject, and a master control panel operated by the experimenter. 
The consoles each have several switches that are operated by the subject to express 
choices and several lights that inform the subject of the other's choices. The 
master control panel permits the experimenter to arrange in a prescribed manner the 
number of disagreements that will occur between the two subjects. If both subjects 
choose the top rectangle as the correct answer, the Interaction Control Machine will 
inform each that the other chose the bottom rectangle as correct if the experimental 
manipulation requires them to disagree. Their final choice, therefore, will require 
each of them to decide whether s/he is right and her/his partner wrong, or s/he is 
wrong and her/his partner right. 
If the subject's final choice is the same as her/his initial choice, the 
response is an S-response (for "stay"), and it is assumed that the subject has 
decided that s/he is right and the other wrong. If the subject's final choice is 
different from her/his initial choice, the response is an 0-response (for "other"), 
and it is assumed that the subject has decided that s/he is wrong and the other is 
right. The probability of an S-response is the measure of the distribution of 
influence used in the experiment. 
In both experiments reported here, the subjects were told that they disagreed 
20 times out of the 25 trials of the experiment in its second phase. The agreements 
were randomly distributed, but in such a way that one agreement appeared in each 
block of five trials. 
Subjects were told that what mattered was their team score, not their indivi-
dual choices. If two of them made the right choice, they were given a score of 2; 
if one of them made a right choice and one a wrong choice, they were given a score 
of 1, if neither made a right choice, they were given a score of 9. At the end of 
the experiment, they were told that their cumulative team score would be used to 
evaluate how well they had done. 
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4. First experiment. 
In experiment I, 44 junior college females were made inconsistent in status 
and ability, and then jointly performed a contrast sensitivity task. On completing 
phase 1 of the experiment, 20 of them were told that they had very high contrast 
sensitivity while their partner had very low contrast sensitivity. As phase 2 began, 
the experimenter read to them information from forms they had filled out at the 
beginning of phase 1, informing the subjects that one of them was a junior college 
student, the other was a graduate student at Stanford. A second group of 24 sub-
jects was told that they had very low contrast sensitivity while their partners had 
very high contrast sensitivity. As phase 2 began, these subjects were told that one 
of them was a junior college student while the other was a freshman at a nearby 
(and relatively low status) high school. These two inconsistent conditions were 
compared with two conditions in which 40 junior college females were tested for 
their contrast sensitivity, but told nothing else about themselves. Twenty of them 
were told at the end of phase 1 that they were very high in contrast sensitivity 
while their partner was very low; 20 were told that they were very low in contrast 
sensitivity while their partner was very high. To assure that the educational dif-
ferences in the inconsistency conditions were in fact status characteristics in this 
population, two further conditions were run, in both of which only the diffuse 
characteristic was manipulated. For these two conditions, there was no test for 
contrast sensitivity. The experiment began with phase 2, in which 20 subjects were 
told that one of them was a junior college student while the other was a graduate 
student at Stanford, and 20 were told that one of them was a junior college student, 
the other was a freshman in the same nearby high school used in the inconsistency 
condition. 
Basically, we want to distinguish a balancing from a combining resolution of 
the inconsistent status situations. But there are a number of possible ways of 
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balancing inconsistent situations. One is to balance in the direction of the 
specific status characteristic, contrast sensitivity. That is, all individuals 
might define the situation in terms of contrast sensitivity whether they have a high 
or a low state of the characteristic. This result, in fact, could occur for two 
rather different reasons: Because the situation is already well-defined in terms of 
contrast sensitivity before phase 2 of the experiment begins, there may be no need 
for further definition of the situation. It could well be the case that a diffuse, 
and presumably non-relevant, status characteristic is used to define a situation only 
because there is no more relevant definition. If a more relevant, more direct defi-
nition is available, this may remove the pressure to further define the situation, 
and reduce or eliminate the effect of the diffuse status characteristic. In the 
language of the theory of status characteristics and expectation-states, the diffuse 
status characteristic would not be activated. Alternatively, it is possible that 
the diffuse characteristic is activated—that is, the evaluations and expectations 
associated with the states of the characteristic are attributed to the particular 
individual—but the relevance of the specific characteristic in the situation is so 
clear a consequence of the structure of the social situation that all individuals 
define the situation according to the specific status characteristic, contrast sen-
sitivity, whether their own state of the characteristic is high or low. Classrooms, 
in other words, may so clearly define what is appropriate in them that male students, 
are not affected by the fact that their professor is female, even if they in fact 
believe she is less knowledgeable than other professors simply because she is 
female. In either case, if subjects balance in the direction constrained by the 
structure of the task situation, we should find that the probability of an 
S-response (P(S)) for subjects with high contrast sensitivity should equal the P(S) 
for subjects with high contrast sensitivity but low educational status. The P(S) 
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for subjects with low contrast sensitivity should equal the P(S) for subjects with 
low contrast sensitivity but high educational status. To assure that this effect is 
not simply due to the fact that educational status is meaningless in the population 
from which the subjects are drawn, we must also find that the P(S) for subjects with 
high educational status exceeds that for subjects with low educational status. 
To have a compact way of expressing expectation-states for use in compressing 
the experiment's results, it will be useful to introduce a simple notation at this 
point. The conventional notation for expectation-states assigns a positive or nega-
tive sign, or an II or L letter for high and low states of any characteristic—mean-
ing the positively or negatively-valued states. An individual's expectation-state 
is represented by an ordered pair of these signs or letters, first position for 
self and second position for other. Thus, HL would represent an individual who had 
high contrast sensitivity relative to another who had low contrast sensitivity. If 
there are two status characteristics, the situation is represented by an ordered 
pair of ordered pairs, the first pair giving the states of both characteristics for 
self, the second giving the states of both characteristics for other. In the pres-
ent investigation, in which one characteristic is diffuse and the other specific, we 
will use the first position for each individual to represent the diffuse character-
istic, and the second to represent the specific characteristic. A diffuse status 
characteristic is further identified by a cap over the representation of its state, 
in order to distinguish it from a specific status characteristic when one or the 
/V A 
other of the two is not defined. Thus, HL-LH might be a male student of a female 
A A A 
professor, HL a male-female relation, LH a student-professor relation. Or IIL-LII 
might be, as in the present experiment, an individual whose educational status is 
high but whose contrast sensitivity is low, relative to another whose educational 
A 
status is low but whose contrast sensitivity is high. HL in this experiment repre-
sents an individual whose educational status is higher than her partner's, LH rep-
resents an individual whose contrast sensitivity is lower than her partner's. 
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If inconsistent subjects balance in such a way as to define the situation in 
the direction constrained by its structure, we should therefore find that 
; HL = LII-HL > HL-LI1 = LH 
(1) \ 
! /V A / HL > LH 
A second possibility is that all individuals balance in such a way as to 
define the situation in terms of their higher status. While this result is on 
present evidence implausible, it is possible that the failure to define inconsis-
tency from an interactionist perspective is so crippling that we have failed to 
observe a Lenski effect when in fact it is there. If individuals do regularly 
balance in this manner, we should find that 
' HL-LH = HL 
(2) \ LH-HL = HL I 
/ /v \ HL > LH 
In principle, there is a third possibility: All individuals might balance 
in the direction of the diffuse status characteristic. This might happen if educa-
tion were a "master trait" in the Hughes sense of the term, that is, if it were of 
such overwhelming significance in the larger society that it dominated any other 
characteristic. But in the present investigation, we neglect this possibility, 
because nothing in our previous research lends much credence to it. 
Finally, if some individuals balance in the direction of the directly rele-
vant characteristic, contrast sensitivity, while others balance in the direction of 
their educational status, we should find that inconsistents have a P(S) that is 
less than that of subjects with high contrast sensitivity, but more than that of 
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subjects with low contrast sensitivity. Whether inconsistents with high contrast 
sensitivity but low education differ from inconsistents with low contrast sensitiv-
ity but high education depends on the relative strengths of the specific and diffuse 
status characteristics, about which we have almost nothing to say. If anything, 
however, we would expect the specific status characteristic to be stronger than the 
diffuse status characteristic. Hence, we should find that 
A result like (3) of course is consistent with a combining hierarchy as well 
as balance. That is, (3) is what we would observe if the expectation-states that 
each individual formed were a linear combination of the independent effects of edu-
cation and contrast sensitivity. What distinguishes the two results is the distri-
bution of P(S) around the means of the two inconsistency conditions. If all sub-
jects balance, but some balance in the direction of their contrast sensitivity and 
some in the direction of their education, the distribution of P(S) should bebimodal. 
If the subjects combine inconsistent status characteristics, the distribution of 
P(S) should be unimodal around the mean. 
A total of 140 subjects took part in the experiment. They were recruited on 
a volunteer basis and paid for their participation. Of the 140 subjects who took 
part in the experiment, 16 were eliminated from analysis of the results for violat-
ing one or more of the initial conditions of the experiment, as determined by post-
experimental interviews. Twelve subjects were eliminated because they were suspi-
cious that the manipulations of the experiment were deceptions. Subjects were 
counted suspicious only if they said that they had discounted the instructions in 
their behavior during the experiment. Those who were suspicious after the fact 
HL > LH-HL > HL-£H > LH 
(3) 
/ \ HL > LH 
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but claimed that they had not altered their experimental behavior were included in 
the analysis. One subject was eliminated because she was a member of a visible 
minority group, which became apparent to her partner during the experiment. Three 
subjects were eliminated because they failed to understand some part of the instruc-
tions. A total of 124 subjects was therefore available for analysis. 
The basic data of the experiment are shown in Table 1—the mean, variance and 
proportion (of the 20 critical, or disagreement, trials of the experiment) of 
S-responses by condition. Table 2 shows the Mann-Whitney test statistics for the 
comparisons that are necessary in evaluating the results of the experiment. The 
frequency distributions of S-responses for the contrast sensitivity and inconsis-
tency conditions of the experiment are shoxra in Table 3. 
(Table 1 about here) 
First, note that subjects who believe their partner is a high school freshman 
are significantly less likely to defer to their partner's judgment than subjects who 
believe their partner is a Stanford graduate student (rows 1 and 2 of Table 1). 
This is not in itself news. The difference between the two proportions, 14%, is 
about the same as that obtained in earlier experiments. But this difference is suf-
ficiently large to make it reasonable to draw conclusions from the inconsistency 
conditions. It cannot be argued that a failure to find a combining effect is due to 
failure to manipulate the diffuse status characteristic. 
(Table 2 about here) 
But the data of the experiment do not provide a decisive answer to the ques-
tion of balancing vs. combining. Two balance models do seem clearly ruled out: 
First, there is no Lenski effect here. If all subjects balanced so as to maximize 
their status, those subjects who had low education but high contrast sensitivity 
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(the LH-HL subjects) would have a P(S) equal to those who had high contrast 
sensitivity (the HL subjects). But a Mann-Whitney U test shows that the difference 
between the two (.85-.79, from rows 3 and 5 of Table 1) is statistically signifi-
A /S 
cant. Those subjects who had high education but low contrast sensitivity (the HL-LH 
subjects) should have a P(S) equal to those who have high education (the HL sub-
jects). But the difference between these two conditions (.67-.37, from rows 1 and 
4 of Table 1) is one of the largest in the experiment. 
Second, it seems reasonable to rule out the weaker Hughes' effect also. 
Table 1 shows that the 1H-HL subjects are clearly affected by the fact that they 
have low education, even though they are superior at the contrast sensitivity task. 
(Table 3 about here) 
The distribution of S-responses for this condition (in Table 3, column 2) shows 
that they are combining education and contrast sensitivity into a single linear 
function, not dividing into two populations, one of which balances in the direction 
of higher ability, the other in the direction of diffuse status. The variance of 
A A 
LH-IIL distribution is not significantly different from the variance of the HL dis-
tribution (Table 1, from rows 3 and 5), and the shape of the two distributions 
(columns 1 and 2 in Table 3) is very nearly the same. A Kolmogorov-Smimov test of 
the differences between these two distributions, adjusted for their difference in 
location, will show no significant difference between them. But combining, although 
consistent with the behavior of the LH-HL subjects, is not consistent with the 
A. 
behavior of the HL-LII subjects. Those subjects who had high education but low con-
trast sensitivity—those subjects who were told that they had very low ability at 
this task but whose partner was only a high school freshman—had a P(S) exactly equal 
to the low ability subjects (.37 = .37, from rows 4 and 6 of Table 1). They do not 
seem to have been at all affected by the lower status of their partner. 
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Thus, higher ability subjects were considerably affected by the fact that the 
partner was a graduate student, but lower ability subjects were not affected by the 
fact that their partner was only a high school freshman. 
5. Second experiment 
It is quite possible that subjects who believe they are inferior behave dif-
ferently than subjects who believe they are superior, but we are reluctant to accept 
this explanation of the result of experiment I. On grounds of simplicity alone, it 
is unsatisfactory. But even if we are willing to live with a complicated model, the 
result is still anomalous. The usual argument is that low ability subjects are dif-
ferent because they are ego-protective. But if any subjects are protecting their 
egos, it should be high ability subjects who balance and low ability subjects who 
combine. Because we find the opposite effect, we consider the possibility that some 
artifact of the experiment's technique explains its peculiar result before accepting 
it at face-value. 
A careful study of the post-session interviews and a close examination of the 
technique of the experiment suggests four possible artifcats. Three have to do with 
extraneous sources of variation that may have operated in the experiment, which, 
even if constant across its six conditions, may have had differential effects on the 
two inconsistency conditions. One of these extraneous sources of variation might 
A A 
explain how subjects in the LH-HL condition (in which the other is incompetent but a 
Stanford graduate student) might be constrained to combine inconsistent status char-
acteristics, even though the natural tendency is to balance. Two might explain how 
SS A 
subjects in the HL-LH condition (in which the other is exceptionally competent but 
only a high school freshman) might behave as if they balance, even though the natu-
ral tendency is to combine inconsistent status characteristics. 
The first of these extraneous sources of variation is the fact that all sub-
jects came to the Stanford Laboratory for Social Research to participate in the 
experiment. It is possible that the context of the experiment had different effects 
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on the salience of different states of the diffuse status characteristic. The fact 
that the experiment was at Stanford, that the experimenter was some sort of Stanford 
functionary, may have made "Stanford graduate student" salient without making "high 
school freshman" salient to the same degree. If that were true, we would have 
A 
(4) LH-HL 
^ ^ A A. 
for the LH-HL condition, but for the HL-LH condition, we would have only 
(5) LH. 
One could well argue that (4) does not satisfy the most important initial condition 
of the experiment, partial relevance; that in (4), both the diffuse and the specific 
status characteristic are made relevant by the structure of the experimental situa-
tion, and that is why they combine. If this argument is correct, we get balancing 
in the only condition that is partially relevant, and combining only where the struc-
ture of the situation wholly constrains the way in which the characteristics come to 
be related. 
A second extraneous source of variation is that all of the subjects are 
females. Not that females behave differently than males: If they do, that still 
/N A A 
will not explain why LH-HL subjects behave differently than HL-LH subjects, because 
both are female. But post-session interviews with the subjects uncovered some who 
thought their partners were male—possibly because the experiment was conducted at 
Stanford, which at one time had a sex ratio of 3:1 in favor of males, possibly 
because the lower status was a high school "freshman," which to some subjects may 
literally have meant a male. We found no evidence that there were more subjects who 
A A 
thought their partners male in the HL-LH condition, but even if the number were the 
same for both inconsistency conditions, the effect on them would be different. In 
A. A 
the LH-HL condition, we would have 
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A A A A (6) LIIL-HLH 
(where sex is in the third position, counting from the left), but in the HL-LH 
condition, we would have 
(7) HLL-LHH. 
In (6), sex reinforces education; in (7), it has the opposite effect. Thus, in one 
inconsistency condition, the extraneous characteristic cancels the effect of the 
status manipulation and reinforces the effect of the ability manipulation. In the 
other, it reinforces the manipulation of status and works against the manipulation 
A 
of ability. If this argument is correct, we get combining in both the HL-LH and the 
LH-HL conditions; but in the HL-LH condition, the effect of one diffuse status char-
acteristic cancels the effect of the other, making it appear as if subjects balanced 
in the direction of the specific status characteristic. 
A third extraneous source of variation is that all the subjects are junior 
college students. Past experience with junior college subjects (male or female) in 
the Bay Area suggests that many have a general image of themselves as inferior, often 
because they have tried to get into four-year colleges and not been admitted. The 
experiment could well have failed to free what was taking place in the experiment 
from the subjects' past experiences, and therefore allowed low self-esteem to have 
an effect.10 If it did, even if our technique failed to the same extent in all con-
ditions, the effect on the two inconsistency conditions would be different. In the A A LH-HL condition, we would have 
(8) LHL-IILH 
A A 
(where self-esteem, italicized, is in third position), but in the HL-LH condition, 
we would have 
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(9) HLL-LHH. 
That is, the effect would be to reinforce the low ability manipulation but counteract 
the high ability manipulation. In previous expectation experiments, the effect of 
generalized self-esteem has never been strong enough to alter the basic processes at 
work. But even if implausible, the possibility must be taken into account. Again, 
A A 
if this factor is at work, the effect is to make a combining process in the HL-LH 
condition appear as if it were a balancing process. 
A fourth, possible artifactual explanation has nothing to do with extraneous 
sources of variation, but like the sex and self-esteem variables, it would explain 
A A 
why HL-LH subjects balanced when the natural tendency in partially relevant status 
situations is to combine inconsistent characteristics. It is possible that the 
higher and lower states of the diffuse characteristic, education, were not equidis-
tant from the subject. That is, the social distance between a junior college stu-
dent and a Stanford graduate student is probably greater than the distance between a 
junior college student and a high school freshman. If the strength of combining 
depends on the status distance between self and other, the distance between junior 
college student and high school freshman may not have been sufficient to produce an 
observable effect. Or more exactly, the technique of the experiment may have been 
insensitive to an effect that was actually there. 
It does not really matter which of the four explanations is correct if we can 
honestly come to some conclusion about how individuals resolve inconsistency. It 
does not really matter, for example, that it was low self-esteem rather than the 
assumption that the other was male that explains why subjects did not combine if we 
can decide that in fact they combine. Therefore, if we can think of a way to do it, 
there is no serious objection to confounding all four factors in a single experiment, 
i.e., removing all four artifacts at the same time. 
I 
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That is what we do in our second experiment: We remove all four artifacts at 
the same time,, in a way that should tell us whether subjects in partially relevant 
status situations balance or combine inconsistent status characteristics. The exper-
A A 
iment exactly replicates the IIL-LH condition of experiment I, except that it uses 
subjects from a population of male Stanford freshmen instead of female junior col-
lege students. Because the subjects are male, if they do assume that their partners 
are female, the effect will reinforce rather than cancel the effect of education— 
and probably they are less likely to assume that the others are female. Because 
they are Stanford students, they probably have a higher level of self-esteem than 
the junior college students did. Because the other is still a high school freshman, 
the status distance from self to other is probably greater than in experiment I. 
But because the other has no heightened salience in a Stanford laboratory, there 
should be no contextual effect in experiment II, which is important in maintaining 
the partial relevance that the experiment requires. 
This design, of course, is focused more on explaining away the balance 
A A A A 
result in the HL-LH condition of experiment I than the combining result in the LH-HL 
condition. There are three reasons for this: First, we had begun by believing that 
individuals in partially relevant status situations would balance, on the assumption 
that an already xjell-defined situation would eliminate pressure to use a diffuse 
status characteristic in defining it. It therefore seemed to us important at the 
time to put the burden of proof on the balance principle rather than combining. 
Second, it was in any case true that almost all of the artifacts we could think of 
A /S 
explained why subjects in the HL-LH condition balanced when they should have com-
/N /S 
bined, rather than why subjects in the LH-HL condition combined when they should 
have balanced. Third, replicating the ilL-LH condition does permit an indirect 
/V A 
inference about the contextual effect that might have induced subjects in the LH-HL 
condition to combine when they would otherwise balance. There are three ways in 
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which a contextual effect could be eliminated: We could replicate the experiment, 
except for a shift in its diffuse status characteristic, choosing an alternative 
that would not interact with the Stanford setting—for example, race. We could 
replicate the experiment, except for a shift in its setting, choosing an alternative 
that would not interact with the diffuse status characteristic—for example, by mov-
ing the laboratory to the junior college from which the subjects were drawn. Or we 
A 
could replicate the HL-LH condition, in which we assume there is no contextual 
effect. From the first two, if we found a balancing effect after relaxing the 
structural constraints created by the context, we would conclude that individuals in 
partially relevant, inconsistent status situations balance, and we found combining 
A. ~ 
in the LH-HL condition of experiment I only because it made both characteristics 
salient and relevant. If we found combining, we would have to give up this argu-
ment. From the third, if we are willing to assume that all balance-inducing arti-
facts have in fact been eliminated, if we find combining, we must conclude that 
combining in the LH-HL condition was not due to any special structural constraint; 
if we find balancing, we must conclude that the combining result in the LH-
fiL con-
dition was due only to the constraining effect of its context. This third line of 
A 
reasoning seems to us justified. If it is, replication of the HL-LH condition is 
obviously the most economical choice of the three, because it deals at the same time 
with the other three factors we want to eliminate. 
We assume from previous experience with the population that the diffuse 
A 
status characteristic is meaningful in it, and we therefore do not repeat the HL 
condition. Experiment II does, however, require a baseline condition, i.e., a 
replication of the LH condition, to which to compare the HL-LH condition. In both 
conditions, the subjects are Stanford male freshmen. In the LH condition, all sub-
jects are told that they have poor contrast sensitivity. In the HL-LH condition, 
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after they are told their contrast sensitivity scores, they are told that one of them 
is from Stanford and the other is a freshman from the same nearby high school used in 
the manipulation of diffuse status in experiment I. If the underlying process at 
work in partially relevant status situations is the formation of a combining hier-
A A 
archy, we should find that the HL-LH condition has a higher P(S) than the LH condi-
tion. If the underlying process is the formation of a balanced, univalent hierarchy, 
A A, 
then we should find that the IIL-LH condition has a P(S) equal to that of the LH 
condition. 
(Table 4 about here) 
The results of experiment II show that the balancing mechanism at work in the 
a ^ 
IIL-LH condition of the first experiment was most probably an artifact of the exper-
iment's technique. The experimental results are shown in Tables 4 and 5. Only 20 
subjects were run in this experiment—we stopped when the conclusion seemed suffici-
ently clear. None of the subjects violated the initial conditions of the experiment: 
That is, no one was suspicious, no one was a member of a visible minority group that 
became evident to another subject in the course of the experiment, no one misunder-
stood the instructions. This in itself may seem sufficiently unusual to cast doubt 
A A 
on the results of the experiment, but the difference between the LH and HL-LII condi-
tions of experiment II is likely to have occurred by chance only once in 20 
experiments. 
We therefore conclude that 
(Table 5 about here) 
there is no status dilemma. In a partially relevant status situation, if individuals 
are inconsistent, the hierarchy they form is simply a linear combination of the inde-
pendent effects of the inconsistent status characteristics. Our experiments, of 
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course, are insensitive to awkwardness, tension, the sense that a situation is 
problematic. But if it is reasonable to draw inferences about status dilemmas from 
the way in which inconsistency is resolved, and it is agreed that status character-
istics are general, that they have important properties in common simply because 
they are status characteristics, then experiments I and II taken together imply that 
a female professor is neither a female nor a professor, she is some combination of 
the two; a black doctor is neither a black nor a doctor, he is a black doctor. Male 
students are neither males nor students, they are male students; white patients are 
neither whites nor patients, they are white patients. Male students defer to the 
judgment of female professors more than they do to other females but less than they 
do to other professors. White patients defer to the judgment of black doctors more 
than they do to other blacks but less than they do to other doctors. It is, of 
course, possible that if one of the individuals in the situation does not accept the 
legitimacy of a characteristic that determines the behavior of an other, there will 
be conflict—for example, if the female professor does not believe that females are 
less competent than males. But if the characteristics, though inconsistent, have 
the same meaning to both p and o, there does not seem to be anything problematic 
about their interaction. 
6. Conclusion. 
We do not claim to have the final answer to the consistency problem. Experi-
ment II did not replicate all conditions of experiment I, the number of subjects was 
small, we did not investigate the combination of two completely non-relevant status 
characteristics. But our tentative judgment at this state of our research is that 
in a partially-defined multi-characteristic status situation, those whose status and 
ability are inconsistent combine the two into a single linear-additive status order. 
We found no Lenski effect: Subjects in experiment I who had high ability but low 
status had a lower probability of an S-response than those who had only high ability; 
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subjects who had high status but low ability had a lower probability of an S-response 
than those who had high status. We found no Hughes effect: The distributions of the 
probability of an S-response around the mean value were unimodal for all the incon-
sistent conditions in both experiments. The fact that the situation was already 
well-defined by ability, and status therefore unnecessary to its definition, did not 
seem to induce balance: That those who had high status but low ability had a proba-
bility of an S-response equal to those who had only low ability in the first experi-
ment proved to be an artifact of the experiment's technique. This result did not 
replicate in the second experiment. Subjects who had high status but low ability had 
a higher probability of an S-response than those who had only low ability. 
It would be a mistake to suppose that a linear-additive effect in the present 
experiments implies that there is no such thing as status inconsistency. Aside from 
the fact that the results of our two experiments are themselves tentative, the theo-
retical analysis guiding them implies at least two conditions that would create some-
thing like the classic inconsistency effect. 
First, note that for conflict-free interaction, the status characteristics 
defining a situation must have the same meaning to both p and o. If sex has a dif-
ferent meaning for a female professor than it has for a male student, their interac-
tion may be problematic. If the female professor, for example, questions the legit-
imacy of sex as a status characteristic—not only in the classroom, but generally— 
while for the male student it has its conventional significance, the one will define 
A /S 
self and other as 1IL, while the other xjill define self and other as HL-LH. The con-
sequence should be a status struggle. The result of the present experiments is that 
individuals combine all the characteristics that legitimately define the situation 
for them. This does not imply that their interaction is conflict-free because it 
does not generalize in any straightforward way to the composition of two or more 
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actors in the same situation. What it implies is that any characteristics in which 
p believes outside a given setting will combine with those that are relevant in the 
setting—that much is perfectly general. But the combining of inconsistent charac-
teristics would create conflict if p and o differed in what they conceived appropri-
ate to combine. This may be less a question of consistency than consensus, but 
nevertheless the kind of conflict inconsistency research often claims to find may be 
of this kind. In any case, it is obviously a mistake to write it off as nonexistent 
at this stage of research. 
Second, note that throughout we have been concerned with status consistency, 
not distributive justice. We follow Homans (1961, Ch. 12) in distinguishing them: 
Status consistency is a matter of the relation between the meanings of two or more 
status characteristics; justice is a matter of the relation between the meaning of a 
status characteristic and a goal-object (or reward). Some "status characteristics" 
that traditionally find a place in the consistency literature are either intrinsi-
cally or symbolically rewards—income, for example. "Rich" and "poor" may imply 
cognitive and evaluative aspects of individuals who are rich and poor, but they also 
are states of a goal-object, wealth. The subject of distributive justice has been as 
confused as the subject of status inconsistency, but the outcome of the most recent 
work on it confirms that there is a justice effect (Cook, 1975). Given a clear frame 
of reference defining the meaning of a reward and a clear definition of an individu-
al's expectation-state, unjust allocation of a reward does create pressure to change 
the structure of the situation. In other words, under certain easily specifiable 
conditions there is_ an inconsistency effect, and they are fairly common conditions. 
What the present experiments do, therefore, is narrow and limit the scope of 
the inconsistency effect, not reject it altogether. From the point of view of a 
given individual, taking account only of p's status characteristic, individuals 
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define self and other by combining all the status information that is meaningful in 
the setting in which interaction is situated. There seems to be nothing problematic 
about multiple status characteristics in themselves. If the status characteristics 
are culturally defined in the same way for the other, the interaction of p and o 
should not be problematic either. 
This result should be quite general: That is, it should apply to any characr 
teristic of individuals that implies cognitive and evaluative conceptions of them, 
whether age, sex, occupation, race, ethnicity, or any other characteristic that sat-
isfies the definition of a status characteristic. If the reasoning that led us to 
choose a partially relevant status situation as a starting place is correct, the same 
principle should extend to completely non-relevant structures. Two diffuse status 
characteristics, neither of which is directly relevant to any activity required by 
the status situation, should also combine—sex and occupation in a jury room, for 
example. If the linear-additive hierarchy extends to this kind of structure, then 
the combining principle does not depend on whether a status characteristic is speci-
fic or diffuse. It should apply to status characteristics of any kind, from arith-
metic skills to occupational prestige, subject only to the condition that they are 
not defined by culturally accepted convention as irrelevant. Finally, the fact that 
the effect is linear and additive implies that the combining mechanism extends quite 
straightforwardly to any number of characteristics. If two are additive, nothing 
stands in the way of extending the principle to three, four, five or more 
characteristics. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. See Lenski, 1954, for Lenski's earliest argument that there is a nonadditive as 
well as additive effect in multi-characteristic status situations. Lenski, 1956, 
attempts to explain this effect and extend the argument. Not until Lenski, 1966, 
is it clear how much the argument depends on assuming that all individuals maxi-
mize status. Tests of the theory by Lenski or his students include Goffman, 
1957; Jackson, 1962; Jackson and Burke, 1965; and Lenski, 1967. 
2. That is, we prefer an additive model because it is simpler, not because the data 
prove the nonadditive model false. Throughout, we assume the reader is familiar 
with the literature challenging Lenski's methods of observation and inference, 
i.e., the literature on the "identification problem" in research on consistency 
and mobility. For the reader who is not, see particularly Blalock, 1966; 
Blalock, 1967a; Blalock, 1967b; and Blalock, 1967c. Also, see Mitchell, 1964, 
which is the first published criticism of the identifiability of consistency 
models; Lenski's reply, Lenski, 1964; and Hyman, 1966. 
3. Duncan, 1966, was concerned largely with mobility effects, but he pointed out 
that the problem of inferring such effects was more general and extended to con-
sistency effects. He proposed identifying mobility and consistency effects with 
the behavior of the residual variance after estimating an additive model. This 
method is applied in Hodge, 1970; Hodge and Siegel, 1970; Jackson and Burke, 1965; 
Jackson and Curtis, 1972; Laumann and Segal, 1971; Segal and Knoke, 1971; Segal, 
Segal and Knoke, 1970; and Treiman, 1964. 
4. See the references cited in note 3. The only one to find evidence of a consis-
tency effect by Duncan-Blalock methods is Jackson and Burke, 1965, but the effect 
fails to replicate in Jackson and Curtis, 1972. Jackson and Curtis is the most 
thorough and complete of these investigations. 
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5. For example, see Benoit-Smullyan, 1944; Geschwender,. 1967; Romans, 1953 and 
Homans, 1961; Hughes, 1945; Kimberly, 1966; Sampson, 1963; Zelditch and 
Anderson, 1966. 
6. A "balance" theory is any theory in which the individual elements may take on 
two or more mutually exclusive values, and systems of such elements are stable 
if and only if univalent elements combine and elements of distinct value segre-
gate. Although it refers to a wider class of theories (for example, to cogni-
tive and sentiment as well as status structures), we use the term here simply as 
a synonym for consistency, congruence, equilibration, and crystallization as 
they are used in the context of multi-characteristic status structures. 
7. Tress has replicated this experiment with the same result. See Tress, 1971. 
Berger, Fisek and Crosbie, 1970, extend the result further. 
8. We do not attempt here a complete exposition of the theory of status character-
istics and expectation states (Berger, Cohen and Zelditch, 1966; 1972), which 
provides the concepts used here to analyze multi-characteristic status situa-
tions. The most recent and compact statement of the theory in its most general 
form can be found in Berger, Conner and Fisek, 1974. 
9. See, for example, Moore, 1968; Berger and Conner, 1969; Berger, Cohen and 
Zelditch, 1972; and the series of experiments reported in Berger, Conner and 
Fisek, 1974. 
10. This is not a very plausible idea, but nevertheless must be taken into account. 
The technique of expectation-states experiments requires randomly assigning sub-
jects to conditions in which they are either very good at a task at which their 
partner is poor, or poor at a task at which their partner is very good. But 
most subjects come into the laboratory with a good deal of prior personal exper-
ience that makes it difficult to create the required initial conditions. It is 
difficult to persuade subjects who did poorly in math at school that they have 
- A O -
superior mathematical ability, or to persuade subjects who did well in math at 
school that they have poor mathematical ability, even where one needs only to 
convince them of their ability or inability relative to a stranger. Expectation-
states experiments therefore create artificial, unfamiliar abilities like "con-
trast sensitivity" or "meaning insight ability" with which subjects have had no 
prior personal experience. This tends to free the behavior of the subject not 
only from prior experience with specific abilities but also tends to reduce the 
effects of more general conceptions of self-esteem. 
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Table 1. Proportion, mean number of S-responses, and variances 
for female junior college subjects in experiment I. 
S-Responses 
Condition N Proportion Mean Variance 
1. 
A 
IIL 20 .67 13.4 13.6 
2. 
/S 
LH 20 .53 10.7 14.0 
3. A /\ LH-HL 20 .79 15.7 5.8 
4. 
A />. 
HL-LII 24 .37 7.4 13.7 
5. HL 20 .85 17.0 5.0 
6. LH 20 .37 7.4 11.5 
Table _2. Mann-Whitney U statistics for differences between 
conditions in experiment JE. 
Test Statistics 
Conditions Compared U 
1. HL vs. LH 
/v A 
2. HL vs. LH-HL 
A A A A 
3. LH-HL vs. HL-LH 
A A 













Table _3. Frequency distribution of_ the number of S-responses 
per subject by condition in experiment 
Number of a a a a 




3 xxx xx 
4 x xxxx 
5 xx 
6 xxxxx x 
7 xx xx 
8 x v 
9 xxx x 
10 xx xxx 
11 x x 
12 xx x 
13 xxx xxx xx 
14 x xxx 
15 xxx xxx 
16 x xx 
17 xx xxxxxxx 
18 xxxxx xxx 
19 xxxxx x 
20 x x 
Table 4_. Proportion, mean number of S-responses, and variances 
for male college students in experiment II.* 
S-responses 











V! A ^ 
The Mann-Whitney U test for the difference between the HL-LH and LH conditions 
shows that a U as small as 27.5 would occur by chance with a probability of about 
.05. (The critical value for the 5% level of significance is actually 27.) 
Table 5_. Frequency distribution of the number of S-responses 
per subject by condition in experiment II. 
Number of A A 








7 x x 
8 x xx 
9 xx x 
10 xx xxxx 
11 x 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
